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PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERALS NEED ATTORNEYS' FEES TO
PROTECT OUR ENVIRONMENT
Ohio River Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Green Valley Coal
Co.I
I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that everyone has an interest in a clean and healthful
environment, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act first included
citizen suits provisions to authorize private enforcement of environmental
laws in 1970.2 The concept of citizen suits was soon adopted by federal
environmental statutes. 3 This new concept, however, is broader than the
traditional notion of citizen suits in two critical aspects.4 First, to bring a
citizen suit under environmental statutes a plaintiff is no longer required to
suffer economic injury.5 Second, under the new notion of citizen suits,
individual citizens and public interest groups can sue not only to vindicate
plaintiffs injury, but also to enforce environmental rights. 6 Had it not
been for the citizen suits, the American environmental law would not have
been enforced as it has been in the past three decades, and our
environment and natural resources would have been totally different from
what it is today.7
In order to encourage citizen suits, Congress altered the American
Rule and included fee-shifting provisions in most environmental statutes
allowing the courts to grant attorneys' fees to private citizens who brought
lawsuits to further the goals of environmental statutes.8 To determine
' 511 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2007).
2 Barton Thompson Jr., Promoting the Public's Interest, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL.






8 Kelly L. Jones, Comment, Sierra Club v. EPA: Is Changing the American Rule for
Attorneys'Fees Unamerican? The Debate on Congressional fee-Shifting Statutes, 18 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 245, 254 (2004).
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whether a plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, Congress set two different
standards by utilizing two different languages, namely, "prevailing or
substantial prevailing party," and "whenever appropriate."9 Moreover,
whether a plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees is further determined by
the "catalyst theory," which was developed by case law.' 0 Under the
catalyst theory, a plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as long
as the plaintiff obtains his desired result as a product of the lawsuit. 1 In
other words, a judicial decision or court remedy in favor of the plaintiff is
not required.12 Except for the Fourth Circuit, the catalyst theory was well
accepted by almost all federal courts for both the prevailing party standard
and the whenever appropriate standard. However, things changed in 2001
when the Supreme Court handed down its decision on Buckhannon Bd
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, a fourth circuit case, holding that the catalyst theory was not
permissible under the prevailing party standard.13
Ohio River Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Green Valley
Coal Co. is also a Fourth Circuit case seeking for an award of attorney's
fees under the "whenever appropriate" standard. In Ohio River, the Fourth
Circuit held that the catalyst theory was permissible under the whenever
appropriate standard. This note will study the development of the catalyst
theory before and after Ohio River, and will explore possible solutions to
deal with the important issues of environmental protection left by
Buckhannon.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
9 Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in
Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 11 (2004).
10 Parham v. Sw Bell Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1970).
1 E. Carter Chandler, Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council: The future of Fee Shifting in
Environmental Litigation, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 477, 484 (2004), see
also Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2001) ("Petitioners argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees
under the 'catalyst theory,' which posits that a plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it
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Green Valley Coal Company ("Green Valley"), a surface coal
mining company in West Virginia, appealed an award of attorney's fees in
a citizen suit brought by three environmental organizations, Ohio River
Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc., Hominy Creek Preservation
Association, Inc., and Citizen Coal Council (collectively, "OVEC")14
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA").'5 In
January 2000, OVEC brought this action against the Director of the West
Virginia Division of Environmental Protection ("state agency") alleging
that the state agency had been consistently approving permit applications
without adequate cumulative hydrologic impact assessments ("CHIA")
required by the SMCRA.16 Green Valley intervened to defend the validity
of its two permit applications known as incidental boundary revisions 6
and 7 ("IBR 6" and "IBR 7"). 17
After a four-day hearing in mid-June, the district court denied
relief to IBR 7, but issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the state
agency from approving IBR 6 for inadequate CHIA.'" On April 11, 2001,
the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction after Green Valley
withdrew IBR 6 and replaced it with IBR 9, which concluded phase one of
the litigation.19 In October 2001, OVEC filed an administrative complaint,
a citizen complaint, with the office of the federal Office of Surface Mining
("OSM") in West Virginia alleging that Green Valley Hominy Creek
20
operations violated SMCRA. In October 2002, phase two of the
litigation commenced when OVEC successfully filed supplemental claims
against Green Valley in the district court.2 1 OVEC dismissed its
supplemental claims without prejudice on May 3, 2004 after Green Valley
took remedial measures prompted by OSM's notice of violation.22
14 Ohio River Valley Evntl. Coal Inc. v. Green Valley Coal Co., 511 F.3d, at 410 (4th Cir.
2007).
s 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (2000).
16 Ohio River Valley Evntl. Coal Inc., 511 F. 3d at 411.




21 Id. at 412-13.
22 1d. at 413.
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The district court awarded OVEC costs of litigation, including fees
for attorneys and expert witnesses, plus prejudgment interest pursuant to
SMCRA's fee shifting provision, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d),23 based on the
degree of success OVEC achieved in both phases of the litigation. 24 Green
Valley appealed and OVEC argued alternatively that the fee award for
phase one of the litigation was justified either by the preliminary
injunction itself because of sufficient success on the merits, or by the
catalyst theory because of Green Valley's withdrawal of IBR 6.25 With
respect to the fee award for phase two of the litigation, OVEC argued that
it should be upheld under the catalyst theory for its dual track filings of an
administrative complaint and supplemental claims. 26 The United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit affirmed the fee award with respect to
phase one of the litigation and prejudgment interest on the ground of
catalyst theory.27 Noting that costs arising out of pursuing administrative
remedies could only be awarded under 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e), the court
remanded fee award with respect to phase two of the litigation for
reconsidering whether OVEC's achievement in phase two supported a
catalyst theory fee award.28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Citizen Suits and Fee-shifting Provisions
As early as 1796, the Supreme Court of the United States had
already set the American Rule that in the absence of statutory
modification, a prevailing party is not entitled to collect attorney's fees
23 "The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a)
of this section, may award costs of litigation (including attorney and expert witness fees)
to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. The court may, if
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought require the filing of a
bond or equivalent security in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 30
U.S.C. § 1207(d) (2004).
24 Ohio River Valley Evntl. Coal Inc., 511 F.3d at 413
2 Id. at 413-14.26 Id. at 418-19.
27 Id. at 420.
2 8 Id. at 418-19.
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from a losing party.29 This rule was reaffirmed in 1975 by the Supreme
Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 3o In Alyeska,
the Court emphasized that it was within the province of the legislative
branch to relocate the burden of litigation. 3 1 Exercising its legislative
power, Congress has created statutory exceptions to the American Rule by
including fee-shifting provisions in approximately 150 federal statutes to
encourage citizen suits.32 The notion of "citizen suits" evolved from the
common law "private attorney general doctrine" allowing courts to "award
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who not only vindicated their own rights, but
also benefited all similarly situated plaintiffs."
Since Congress passed the Clean Air Act ("CAA") in 1970, citizen
suit provisions and fee-shifting provisions started appearing in most
environmental statutes. 34 These provisions allow citizens, usually private
environmental groups, to act as "private attorney generals" to enforce
environmental statutes against both private parties and the government for
malfeasance, nonfeasance or both. Citizen suits play an important role
in environmental protection because the governmental agencies are subject
to political pressure, lack effective enforcement capabilities, and
sometimes an agency itself may be in violation of a regulation.3 Fee-
shifting provisions are of particular importance in environmental
litigations because these litigations are costly, and the under-funded
private environmental groups usually litigate against government agencies
and private industries with substantial resources at their disposal.37
Depending on the language used in environmental fee-shifting
statutes, there are two different standards to determine whether plaintiffs
29 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
30 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
31 Id. ("[I]t would be inappropriate for the judiciary, without legislative guidance, to
reallocate the burden of litigation in the manner and to the extent...").
32 Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future ofEnvironmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon Board
& Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department ofHealth & Human Resources, 8
ENvTL. LAW 589,596 (2002).
3 Chandler, supra note 11, at 481-82.
34 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 11.
3 1 Id. at 1.
36 Ugalde, supra note 32, at 594.
37id.
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are entitled to attorneys' fees.3 8 The first standard is the "prevailing or
substantial prevailing party fee-shifting statutes," such as the Clean Water
Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act. 39 The other is the "whenever
appropriate fee-shifting statutes," such as the Clean Air Act and the
SMCRA.40 Although plaintiffs have to meet different requirements to win
attorneys' fees under two different standards, the "catalyst theory" was
used as the basis for attorneys' fees awarded under both standards before
2001.41
B. Catalyst Theory
Catalyst theory, a method of determining whether attorneys' fees
should be shifted from plaintiffs to the defendants was first articulated in
1970 in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 4 2 Parham was a
racially discriminatory employment case brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Its holding, like holdings of many other civil
rights cases, paved the way in which the catalyst theory has been applied
to environmental cases.44
Arthur Ray Parham, an eighteen-year-old black man, applied for a
job at Southwestern Bell and his application was rejected.45 Parham filed a
complaint in federal district court pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
461964. At trial, evidence showed that Southwestern had a history of
hiring more whites than blacks, the blacks constituted less than two
percent of their work force and the majority of black employees worked as
janitors or laborers.47 However, evidence presented by Southwestern
showed that it had adopted an affirmative action program and had hired
38 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 11.
39 id.40 d
41 Id. at 13.
42 See Parham v. Sw. Bell. Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), see also Chandler,
supra note 11.
43 See Parham, 433 F.2d at 422.
4 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 14.
45 Parham, 433 F. 2d at 423.
46 Id. at 424.
47 d
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black employees, including skilled employees such as telephone operators,
clerks and craftsmen, at a much higher rate.48 The trial court found no
evidence of employment discrimination against blacks either as a class or
Parham as an individual.49 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees even though it refused to issue
the injunction relief requested by the plaintiff because the employer had
already ceased the discriminatory conduct.so The court found that the
lawsuit brought by the plaintiff functioned as a "catalyst" to prompt the
employer to implement fair employment policies, and to voluntarily
comply with the requirements for equal employment opportunities.5 1
Under the catalyst theory illustrated by Parham, whether the
attorney's fees should be shifted from a plaintiff to a defendant is
determined by the outcome of the interaction between the plaintiff and the
defendant as a whole. 52 As long as the plaintiff obtains his desired result
as a product of the lawsuit, a judicial decision or court remedy in favor of
the plaintiff is not required.53
C. Demise of the Catalyst Theory under the Prevailing Party Standard
Except the Fourth Circuit, the catalyst theory had been utilized by
all federal courts in determining whether attorneys' fees were awarded in
the context of the "prevailing party standard" until the Supreme Court
handed down its decision on Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources in 2001.54
Buckhannon was a decision based on the Fair Housing Amendments Act
("FHAA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") containing
prevailing party fee-shifting provisions.5 5 Although it was not an
48 Id. at 424-425.
49 Id at 425.
'o Pharm, 433 F.2d at 429-30.
5' Id
52 Chandler, supra note 11, at 484.
53 Id.; see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep,t. of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2001).
54 d
" Id. at 600-01.
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environmental case, it has strong impact on future environmental citizen
suits.
In Buckhannon, plaintiffs challenged that a state statute violated
the FHAA and the ADA after the State issued cease and desist orders
requiring the closure of plaintiffs' residential care facilities for failure to
meet the self-preservation rule defined under the state statute. 6 Plaintiffs
brought a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 5 The
following year, after the state legislature enacted two bills eliminating the
self-preservation rule, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case as moot and
requested attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the FHAA and the
ADA.ss
In its opinion, the Supreme Court asserted that whether the catalyst
theory was allowed under the prevailing party standard was an open
question because the Court never had an occasion to decide on this issue.59
In reliance on the Black Law Dictionary, the Court defined a "prevailing
party" to be "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless
of the amount of damages awarded.6 0 Based on precedent cases, the
Supreme Court attempted to establish a "bright line" rule that only
enforceable judgments on the merits or settlements enforced through
consent decrees may create 'material alteration of the legal relationship
of the parties' necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees." 6'
56 Id. at 600.
s7 Id. at 600-01.
'Id. at 601.
59 Id. at 603 fn. 5 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) ("we expressly
reserved the question")); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992) ("Farrar 'involved
no catalytic effect"');
6 0 Buckhannon Bd & Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 603.
61 Id. at 604; Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (stating that Congress intended
to permit the "interim award of counsel fees when a party has prevailed on the merits of
at least some of his claims."); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (holding that an
award of nominal damages enforceable through judgments or consent decrees was
sufficient to be a base to award attorney's fees); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980)
(holding that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree was a basis to
award attorney fees); Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist.,
489 U.S. 782 (1989) (stating that in order to win attorney's fees the legal relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant must be changed through a court order).
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On the contrary, the catalyst theory allowed an award of an
attorney's fee without judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.6 2 Even under a
limited form of the catalyst theory, a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees
on purely procedural basis, such as lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a
claim. 63 Because the catalyst theory conflicted with the Court's view, in a
5-4 decision the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Fourth Circuit
holding that the catalyst theory was impermissible under the prevailing
party standard in Buckhannon. 4
To support its decision, the majority advanced three policy
justifications. First, the legislative history of the meaning of "prevailing
party" was ambiguous and should be construed narrowly. 65 An award of
attorneys' fees should be allowed only when legislative intent was
unambiguous and exlicit because fee-shifting provisions departed from
the American Rule. 6 Second, the majority disagreed that the catalyst
theory was necessary "to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an
action before judgment in order to avoid an award of attorney's fees." 67 it
was also skeptical about the assertion that the catalyst theory could avoid
deterring plaintiffs from bringing meritorious but expensive cases. 68
Finally, the Court expressed its concern on judicial efficiency
warning that claims for catalyst relief would be "administratively difficult,
fact-specific, and time-consuming." 69 There was no precise rule for
district courts to follow in determining the awarded fees. 70 It was
particularly difficult to determine the awarded fees when plaintiffs did not
succeed on every claim.7 In addition, an award of attorney's fees should
not be the reason for a second major litigation.72
62 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 605.
63 Id.
4 Id. at 599-600.
6 Id. at 607-608.
' Id. at 608.
67 id.
68 id.
69 Id at 609.
70i
71 Id
72Id. at 629-636 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
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Justice Scalia concurred with the majority's opinion in a stronger
term. He warned that with the catalyst theory, plaintiffs could extort
attorneys' fees from victimized defendants for meritless claims.74
Although Justice Scalia was strongly against the catalyst theory, he
conceded that it is Congress who has the final say on the issue.
D. Catalyst Theory and the Whenever Appropriate Standard
Immediately after Buckhannon, lower courts interpreted the
Court's ruling on Buckhannon in different ways. Some lower courts
have interpreted the catalyst theory to be prohibited under any federal
citizen suit statute, while others believed that the theory was still
permissible under the whenever appropriate standard.n
There are sixteen federal environmental statutes utilizing the
whenever appropriate standard to award attorney's fees.78 The controlling
case for the whenever appropriate standard is Ruckelshaus79 which
recognizes the catalyst theory.8o In Ruckelshaus, environmental groups
brought a lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
challenging its promulgation of sulfur dioxide emission standards for coal-
burning power plants. '* The DC circuit rejected all the claims,
nonetheless, it found that it was appropriate to award attorneys' fees to
environmental % oups because of their "contributions to the goals of the
Clean Air Act." 2
The Supreme Court disagreed.83 It conceded that replacing the
term "prevailing party" with "whenever appropriate" in the fee-shifting
provision, Congress intended to award attorneys' fees to parties who only
" Id. at 615.
74 Id. at 618
7 1 Id. at 622.
76 Chandler, supra note 11, at 478.
n See id. 478-479.
78 Ugalde, supra note 32, at 600.
7 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
80 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 24.
81 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681.82 Id. at 682.
81 Id. at 684-686.
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partially prevail by achieving some success but not major success.84
However, because the Court believed that the term "appropriate" did not
suggest a complete rejection of the traditional rule, it concluded that
"some success on the merits must be obtained before a party becomes
eligible for a fee award under a whenever appropriate standard."8 5
Ruckelshaus, however, does not authorize automatic award of
attorneys' fees to prevailing or partially prevailing plaintiffs. To award
attorneys' fees under the catalyst theory, courts must engage a two-prong
test.87 The first prong is a factual inquiry determining whether a lawsuit
was a "catalyst" that prompted the defendant to take actions. The court
must find a causal relationship between the lawsuit and the action. 89 The
second prong is a legal inquiry determining whether the desired result was
required by law and was not a gratuitous act of the defendant. 90 According
to the test, whether the litigation results in a judicial decision or judicially
enforceable court remedy in favor of the plaintiff is irrelevant. '
In addition to the test, lower federal courts rationalize their award
of attorneys' fees on a broader scheme. In Metropolitan Washington
coalition for clean Air v. District of Columbia92 , the D.C. Circuit Court
adopted the "prudent effort standard" to award attorney's fees when the
court found that the lawsuit brought by the plaintiff was the type of action
Congress sought to encourage.93 In Stoddard v. West Carolina Regional
Sewerage Authority9, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the award of
attorneys' fees was because plaintiffs attempted to ensure compliance with
the statute exactly the way Congress contemplated and plaintiffs had
8 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688, 704 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2008).
8 Id. at 682, 684, 686 ("[T]he consistent rule is that complete failure will not justify
shifting fees from the losing party to the winning party.. .English courts have awarded
counsel fees to successful litigants for 750 years...").
86 Chandler, supra note 11, at 492.
8 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Scarlett, 452 F.Supp.2d. 966, 970 (N.D. Cal 2006).88 id.
89 Id.
9 Id.
9 Chandler, supra note 11, at 484.
92 Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air v. D.C., 639 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
9 Id. at 804.
94 Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg'1 Sewerage Auth., 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986).
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served the public interest. 95 Other courts held that an award of attorneys'
fees was appropriate if the statute's goals had been substantially
contributed by the plaintiff's litigation or the public interest had been
furthered because the plaintiffs litigation aided in the interpretation or
implementation of the underlying statutes.9 6
E. Catalyst Theory after Buckhannon
After Buckhannon, the catalyst theory is generally survived in most
Court of Appeals in the context of the whenever appropriate fee-shifting
statutes. 97 In 2007, even the Fourth Circuit held, in Ohio River, that
Ruckelshaus was the controlling law under the whenever appropriate fee-
shifting provisions and the catalyst theory still existed. With regard to the
prevailing party standard, nearly all courts held that the catalyst theory
was no longer the basis for an award of attorneys' fees under prevailing
party standards. 98
However, there have been exceptions. In Barrios v. California
Interscholastic Federation, the Ninth Circuit read Buckhannon
expansively and held that a settlement agreement could be the basis to
award attorney's fees under the prevailing party standard. 99 The District
Court of the District of Columbia reached similar decision in Johnson v.
District of Columbia. 0o The court declined to extend Buckhannon's
holding because it believed that Buckhannon only "arguably expressed
95 Id. at 1209.
96 Chandler, supra note 11, at 493 (citing Carson-Truckee Water Dist. v. Sec'y of the
Interior, 748 F. 2d 523, 525-26 (9th cir. 1984); Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 3
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 42 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Fla. Key
Deer v. Monroe County, 772 F. Supp. 601, 602-03 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
9 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 307 F.3d 1318 (holding that Buckhannon is
inapplicable to the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that attorney's fees could still be awarded under the CAA's
whenever appropriate fee-shifting provisions); Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, 253
Fed.Appx. 684 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that attorney's fees could be awarded under the
catalyst theory).
98 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 42.
9 Barrios v. Cal. interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).
1 Johnson v. D.C., 190 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
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skepticism that such a private settlement could alter the legal relationship
between the parties."10 Moreover, federal circuit courts and district courts
have allowed attorneys' fees under prevailing party statutes by broadly
construing Buckhannon's bright line rule to find a legal relationship
change in a fairly wide range of factual circumstances.102
Although some courts are attempting to resist Buckhannon through
broad construction of its ruling, it is safe to assume that after Buckhannon
the catalyst theory is permissible under the whenever appropriate statutes,
but not permissible under the prevailing party statutes. 0 3 It is true that
basic principles of statutory construction indicate that Congress intended
different outcome by choosing different language in environmental
statutes, but no guidance was given in the language to show whether
"catalyst theory" could be used as the basis for attorneys' fees awarded.104
The big gap created by Buckhannon is probably not what Congress
intended or anticipated when it chose the language in environmental
statutes.' 05
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Green Valley, the Fourth Circuit held that SMCRA's fee
shifting provision supported a catalyst theory fee award.' 0 6 The Court did
not take up the question of whether a preliminary injunction by itself was
sufficient to support a fee award under a "whenever appropriate"
provision. 07 Green Valley challenged the validity of catalyst theory
adopted by the Fourth Circuit by citing Buckhannon Board & Care Home
v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources.1os The Court
refuted Green Valley's challenge for wrong interpretation of the
101 Id at 44.




10 Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Green Valley Coal Co., 511 F.3d. 407, 417
(4th Cir. 2007).
107 Id. at 414.
08 Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 511 F.3d at 414.
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"prevailing party" provision under the controlling law, Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club. 09
The Court found that the district court's findings fulfilled all three
requirements of the catalyst theory despite the fact that the district court's
fee award was not based on that theory. To meet the requirements, the
Court found that the district court's findings proved that OVEC's claims
were not frivolous and the lawsuit was a substantial or significant cause of
Green Valley's remedial efforts.'" 0 In addition, Green Valley's withdrawal
of IBR 6 achieved one of OVEC's purposes that required the state agency
to reconsider the allegedly inadequate CHIA."'
Citing Independent Federation of flight Attendants v. Zipes,112
Green Valley argued that the fee award was inappropriate because Green
Valley was an intervenor and its participation in the litigation was not
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.1 3 The Court found that
although Zipes was not applicable because it did not construe the
"whenever appropriate" standard under SMCRA, Zipes' rationale
supported the fee award in Green Valley for at least two reasons. First,
Green Valley was not blameless.1 4 Second, SMCRA's large objectives
did not justify using Zipes as a protection against liability when Green
Valley intervened to defend allegedly illegal mining permits and
115practices.
The Court held that, under Hensley v. Eckerhart,'16 OVEC could
not recover litigation costs arising out of phase two based on the success
achieved in phase one. A plaintiff was entitled to litigation costs only with
respect to any phase that was successful when a lawsuit involved had
distinct phases. Noting that OVEC could have recovered costs for
109 Id. at 414; see generally Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
110 Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 511 F.3d at 415.
111 Id.
112 Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
113 Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 511 F.3d at 416.114 Zipes, 491 U.S. at 762 ("[T]he union interventor was blameless because there was no
allegation that it had violated Title VII").
115 Id. at 759 ("discretion to award feeds is guided by the 'large objectives' of the
underlying substantive provisions in a statute").
'
16 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
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pursuing administrative remedies under 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e)," 7 the Court
remanded the case for reconsidering whether OVEC's achievement in
phase two supported a catalyst theory fee award."'
V. COMMENT
Since Congress first provided citizen suit provisions in the CAA in
1970, citizen suits, coupled with the judge-made catalyst theory, have
substantially advanced American environmental law over the past thirty
years."' 9 Citizen suits and the catalyst theory play such an important role
in the protection of the nation's environment and natural resources for two
reasons.120 First, damages caused by violations of environmental laws
often are first noticed by an everyday citizen, and second, the
environmental violations caused by the modernization of the industrial
economy have exceeded government's police power.121 Buckhannon is
described by commentators as "the most significant attorney's fees
decision of the generation" because, if the catalyst theory is eliminated
from environmental statutes, the health and welfare of all citizens are
endangered.122
After Ohio River, a case decided by the only circuit court that is
not friendly to the catalyst theory, it can be safely assumed that the
viability of the catalyst theory under the whenever appropriate fee-shifting
standard is unlikely to be challenged.123 The survival of the catalyst theory
under the whenever appropriate standard lightens the negative impact on
117 Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 511 F.3d at 417. "Whenever an order is issued
under this section, or as a result of any administrative proceeding under this chapter, at
the request of any person, a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses
(including attorney fees) as determined by the Secretary to have been reasonably incurred
by such person for or in connection with his participation in such proceedings, including
any judicial review of agency actions, may be assessed against either party as the court,
resulting from judicial review or the Secretary, resulting from administrative proceedings,
deems proper." 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (2000).
118 Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 511 F.3d at 418-419.
119 See Ugalde, supra note 32, at 593-94.
120 See Jones, supra note 8, at 254.
121 See id.
122 See id.; Silecchia, supra note 9, at 40.
123 See Ugalde, supra note 32, at 589.
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the nation's environment and natural resources because most
environmental statutes are whenever appropriate statutes.' 24 However, it is
still problematic and troubling when the catalyst theory is permissible
under one set of environmental statutes and not permissible under the
other set, which will lead to different levels of enforcement of various
statutes. 125 Moreover, although the effort demonstrated by lower federal
courts in resisting Buckhannon's ruling is encouraging, the uncertain and
unpredictable outcomes discourage private citizens or environmental
groups to come forward as enforcers to litigate costly environmental
violations at the risk of huge financial burden.12
In order to maintain the accomplishments achieved by citizen suits
and the catalyst theory in the past three decades, there are many reasons
for Congress to address the issue created by Buckhannon as early as
possible. First, Congress has the responsibility to provide clear guidance
for courts to follow. In 1975, when the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
American Rule in Alyeska, it clearly indicated that only the legislative
branch has the power to reallocate the burden of litigation and Congress
never had the opportunity to decide the applicability of the judge-made
catalyst theory under fee-shifting standards. 7 Congress needs to provide
clear guidelines for the judiciary branch to follow because, in
Buckhannon, the Supreme Court was unable to ascertain the legislative
intent and construed the statute narrowly resulting in such a disparity in
interpretation of fee-shifting standards.1 8 Moreover, even Justice Scalia,
who was strongly against the catalyst theory and raised the extortionist
theory, pointed out that it is Congress who has the final say on the
permissibility of the catalyst theory.129
124Id. at 597.
125 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 61-63.
126 Jones, supra note 8, at 254.
127 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); see also
Silecchia, supra note 9, at 62.
128 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 607-09 (2001).129 Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Second, Congress, not the Court, has the responsibility and
resources to formulate public policy on great issues. 130 In Buckhannon, the
Court advanced policy justifications to bolster its ruling without any
evidentiary basis because courts are not well-equipped or well-suited to do
so.' 3 ' The catalyst theory was held impermissible simply because the
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertion that without the catalyst
theory, defendants would moot the action to avoid an award of attorney's
fees.132 Similarly, the Court did not provide any evidentiary findings to
support the refutation that the catalyst theory could avoid deterring
plaintiffs from bringing meritorious but expensive cases. 133
Thirdly, it is Congress's responsibility to provide a bright line rule
to protect judicial efficiency, especially when the development after
Buckhannon proved that lower courts can still circumvent Buckhannon by
broadly construing the established bright line rule.134 In addition, the wide
gap and outcome unpredictability created by Buckhannon between
prevailing party statutes and whenever appropriate statutes can easily
cause inefficient and wasteful increases in attorney fee litigation.'3 5
Finally, only Congress is well-equipped and well-suited to formulate a
sound and feasible policy to protect the health and welfare of all citizens
because many issues must be delved into deeply.136
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent decision of the Fourth Circuit in Ohio River confirmed
that the catalyst theory is permissible under the "whenever appropriate
standard" but not permissible under the "prevailing party standard." This
disparity between the two sets of environmental statutes created by
130 Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1282 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
131 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. at 608.
132id
133 id.
134 See Silecchia, supra note 9, at 39.
135 Silecchia, supra note 9, at 63.
Id. at 64-72. (Listing eleven issues needing to be studied, for example how to define
"success," catalyst theory and rate in mootness litigation, catalyst theory and settlement
rate).
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Buckhannon will lead to different levels of enforcement of various
environmental statutes. To maintain the accomplishments in
environmental protection achieved by citizen suits and the catalyst theory
in the past thirty years, Congress has the responsibility to address this
issue as early as possible. It is Congress' responsibility as they have the
power to reallocate the burden of litigation. Moreover, only Congress is
well-equipped and well-suited to formulate a public policy with respect to
fee-shifting principles to encourage private general attorneys to enforce
environmental laws. Finally, it is Congress' responsibility to provide clear
guidance for the federal courts to follow. Hopefully, the health and
welfare of all citizens will be benefited by the citizen suits encouraged by
Congress' guidance.
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